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Policy Perspective
• The Current Legislative and Regulatory 
Environment for the Federal Government 
Effectively Eliminates “Leasing” As a 
Financing Option.
• Is This Appropriate in the GWOT Context in 
2005?
MPS Experience
• 13 LoLo/RoRo Ships to Support 3 Marine 
Expeditionary Brigades for 30 Days of 
Combat Were Leased by the Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) in 1983 – 1984
• These MPS Have Been Important Assets to 
the Navy for More Than 20 Years, Including 
Crucial Service in Operation Desert Storm
MPS Experience (Continued)
• This (TAKX) Program Would Not Have Been 
Possible If the Navy Had Been Required to 
Buy the Ships
• Use of the Ships Was Arranged Through 25 
Year Leases (Five, Five-year Periods) From 
Private Investors Who Actually Own the Ships
History of Navy Leasing
• There Is a Long History of the Navy Deploying Leased 
Ships to Augment Military Capability in Times of War:
– 450 Ships in World War II
– 200 Ships in the Korean Conflict
– Navy Refueling Tankers in the Vietnam War
• The Navy Also Regularly Leases Commercially Available 
Equipment:
– Storage Batteries on Nuclear Submarines
– Reduction Gears on Surface Warfare Ships
– Medical Equipment for Navy Hospitals
The End of Leasing
• But, the Ability to Lease Significant Assets ($ 
Billion Investments) Ended in 1985 in a 
Strong Congressional/Treasury/OMB 
Reaction Against the $2.6 Billion TAKX 
Program
• “Never Again” for Major Acquisitions Via 
“Long Term Leases” Was the Washington 
Response After the TAKX Program Was 
Begrudgingly Approved
The MPS Deal
There Were Four Important Advantages of “Leasing”
Over “Purchase” for the MPS:
1) “Design to Launch” in 2 Years Versus 5 to 7 Years
2) Substantial Savings Per Ship by Use of 
Commercial Construction Standards ($182M 
Versus $217M)
3) The Choice Was “Lease Versus Do Without,” Not 
“Lease Versus Purchase”
4) Leasing Was Substantially Cheaper to the 
Government, Measured by the Present Value of All 
Cash Flows Over the Life of the Leases, Including 
the Impact on Treasury Department Revenues
Comparing Purchase to Three Different Viewpoints on the Net 
Total Cost to the Government from Leasing 
(5% semiannual discounting=10.25% per year) (in millions)
AGL JCT SSS
Ship Cost if Purchased (182.4) (178.2) (182.4)
Tax revenue from interest on Treasury Bonds used to finance the purchase
2.5
Net PV of Purchase (182.4) (178.2) (179.9)
Present value of 25 years of capital hire payments by the Navy (135.1) (135.1) (135.1)
Residual value payment by the Navy at termination, net of tax (1.7) (1.7) (1.7)
Lost tax revenue from the amortization deductions (.7) (.7) (.7)
Tax payments by the lessor on capital hire payments received (46% tax rate)
Return of capital component 22.0 22.0 22.0
Interest component 39.7
Lost tax revenue from depreciation deduction (72.4) (72.4)
Total PV with Leasing (148.2) (187.9) (115.5)
Leasing benefit versus purchase            34.2 (9.7) 64.4
Politics and Polemics of the MPS Deal
• But, Leasing Bypasses the Conventional 
Process for Defense Acquisitions:
– Design (ORD)
– Authorization/Appropriation/Expenditure
• Those Persons and Groups Who Believe 
Strongly in That Conventional Process Made 
Sure the TAKX Program Was a One-time 
Aberration and NOT a Trend!
Current Legislative Context
Four Overwhelming Impediments to Long-term Leasing Today Are:
1) Taxation – Disallowance of the Depreciation Tax Shelter 
Advantages of Leasing for All Assets Leased to the Federal 
Government
2) Financial Justification – Disallowance From Consideration in 
Leasing Proposals of Any Impact on Treasury Department 
Revenues, Regardless of What That Impact Might Be
3) Cash Flow Budgeting – Congress Requires That All Contractual 
Financial Obligations Over the Terms of a Lease, Including 
Termination Penalties, Must Be Fully Encumbered in the Navy 
Working Capital Fund Before the Lease Begins.  This Totally 
Defeats the Purpose of Leasing Which Is to Spread Out the Cash 
Flows Over the Period of Use
4) Pre-review and Approval – No Leasing Proposal May Go 
Forward Without Prior Review and Approval By OMB and the 
Treasury, Both of Which Are Clearly Opposed to Any 
Circumvention of the Conventional Acquisition Processes Via 
Lease
Conclusion
• It Can Be Argued That, As in Earlier Wartime 
Periods, Leasing Could Be a Valuable Tool 
Today to Augment Military Capability in the 
Midst of Our “GWOT,” Without Curtailing 
Other Approved Weapons Programs
• It Is in the Power of Congress and the 
Administration to Eliminate the Impediments 
Created in the Mid-1980’s, If They So Choose
The Big Question?
Which Is More Important to National Security in 
the Overall Context of 2005:
1) Full Compliance With the Conventional 
Appropriations Process, or
2) Allowing the Possibilities of Leasing, Under 
Certain Circumstances, Which Circumvents 
Much of the Conventional Process.
